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We study a dichotomy of scientiﬁc styles, unifying and diversifying , as proposed by Freeman J. Dyson. We 
discuss the extent to which the dichotomy transfers from the natural sciences (where Dyson proposed it) 
to the ﬁeld of Pattern Recognition . To address this we must ﬁrstly ask what it means to be a “uniﬁer” or 
“diversiﬁer” in a ﬁeld, and what are the relative merits of each style of thinking. Secondly, given that Dyson 
applied this to the sciences , does it also apply in a ﬁeld known to be a blend of science and engineering? 
Parallels are drawn to Platonic/Aristotelian views, and to Cartesian/Baconian science, and questions are asked 
on what drives the Kuhnian paradigm shifts of our ﬁeld. This article is intended not to marginalise individuals 
into categories (uniﬁer/diversiﬁer) but instead to demonstrate the utility of philosophical reﬂection on our 
ﬁeld, showing the depth and complexities a seemingly simple idea can unearth. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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0. Introduction 
In his 1988 book, Inﬁnite in All Directions , the theoretical physicist
reeman J. Dyson discusses two distinct styles of scientiﬁc thinking:
nifying , and diversifying , claiming that most sciences are dominated
y one or the other in various periods of their history. 
“Uniﬁers are people whose driving passion is to ﬁnd general princi-
ples which will explain everything. They are happy if they can leave
the universe looking a little simpler than they found it.”
“Diversiﬁers are people whose passion is to explore details. They
are in love with the heterogeneity of nature […] They are happy if
they leave the universe a little more complicated than they found it.”
[1, chap. 3, p. 44] 
When I ﬁrst read these quotes, and showed them to colleagues,
here were a number of immediate assumptions. For example, some
ssumed that uniﬁers are theoreticians , and the diversiﬁers are exper-
menters . Others took the dichotomy to be equivalent to scientists vs
ngineers , or to academia vs industry . In association with intellectual
ndeavour, the terms unifying and diversifying seem to come with a
ertain semantic “baggage”. This is exempliﬁed by the media-fuelled
urore surrounding 20th century physics, with science celebrities
eemingly promoting a uniﬁer viewpoint and the search for the ‘ulti-
ate laws of the universe’. ✩ This paper has been recommended for acceptance by Marcello Pelillo. 
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167-8655/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article undeDyson’s treatment of this is relatively short, at just one 18-page
hapter [1] . It is therefore important to moderate our contemporary
iases, if we are to understand what he intended. It seems appropri-
te to engage in a conceptual analysis of these terms, with a major
uestion being whether they have the same meaning in natural sci-
nces (where Dyson conceived them) as they do in a computational
cience like our own. 
Whilst Dyson expands upon his view with examples from physics
nd biology spanning 400 years, our own ﬁeld of Pattern Recogni-
ion 1 is relatively young. If physics is the old man of science, then we
re the spotty teenagers. This considered, it is good to look back and
onsider how far we have come, where we are going, and whether we
an learn something from the older disciplines. This type of philo-
ophical reﬂection allows us to plan objectives, to understand our
otivations, successes and failures, both as a collective and in our in-
ividual pursuits. The purpose of this article is to reﬂect in this way,
n how the dichotomy transfers from the natural sciences to a science
f computation , and more speciﬁcally, Pattern Recognition . 
.1. What are we? 
Pattern Recognition is a multifarious ﬁeld. We study the science
nd engineering elements of data . We are interested in automating
he understanding of data, including prediction and description of phe-
omena. The construction of both heuristic and formal mathematical1 In this article I make no distinction between the ﬁeld of Machine Learning and that 
f Pattern Recognition , as this has been addressed elsewhere. I choose the term PR sim- 
ly because of the name of this journal. 
r the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ ). 
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m  models forms the backbone of our culture. The ﬁeld was spawned
from the dreams of Artiﬁcial Intelligence, though the reality has en-
compassed a far broader scope of study than originally envisioned
at the Dartmouth Conference [2] . However, we are not tackling the
wider integrative challenge of A.I., but instead focused on a restricted
(yet immensely challenging) problem: the automated processing and
inference problems that arise from diverse sources of data. At present,
we encompass aspects of pure/applied statistics and mathemat-
ics, computer science, and biologically-inspired mechanisms, among
others. 
1.2. Structure of this article 
As mentioned, Dyson’s terminology of ‘uniﬁers’ and ‘diversiﬁers’
lends itself to a number of potential implicit meanings—a deeper
analysis of these is a necessary ﬁrst step, tackled in Sections 2 and
3 of this article. Section 4 will explore how the dichotomy transfers
over to Pattern Recognition. For example, something quite explicit
from Dyson’s writings is that he equates unifying with simplicity . This
reﬂects his training in physics, where the belief is widespread that
beautiful (or simpler) theories are more likely to be correct. But what
does this mean in Pattern Recognition, and how is it different than
in natural sciences like physics or chemistry? Sections 5 –7 consider
the nature of work in our ﬁeld, and of how revolutions in a ﬁeld come
about—are they driven by uniﬁers, or diversiﬁers, or both? 
Finally, Section 8 will play Devil’s Advocate, and ask why study
this? What is the value of the dichotomy as a conceptual tool? What
beneﬁts may come, to the individual or to the community, from
addressing these philosophical questions? 
2. Two styles of thinking 
Dyson states that uniﬁers (citing Albert Einstein as the ex-
emplar) believe the universe can be reduced to a ﬁnite set of
principles—a simple, elegant framework, couched in the language of
mathematics—and have the pursuit of this as their primary goal in
science. On the other hand, diversiﬁers (citing Emil Wiechert, a geo-
physicist who discovered the layered structure of the Earth) prefer to
explore the inﬁnite diversity of details in the universe, often creat-
ing new phenomena and tools simply for the sake of exploring those
details. Wiechert delivered a lecture in 1896 in which he stated: 
“So far as modern science is concerned, we have to abandon com-
pletely the idea that by going into the realm of the small we shall
reach the ultimate foundations of the universe. I believe we can aban-
don this idea without any regret. The universe is inﬁnite in all direc-
tions, not only above us in the large but also below us in the small. If
we start from our human scale of existence and explore the content
of the universe further and further, we ﬁnally arrive, both in the large
and in the small, at misty distances where ﬁrst our senses and then
even our concepts fail us.”
Einstein, as a uniﬁer, believed the large and small of the universe
could be abstracted into a single uniﬁed theory. Wiechert, as a diversi-
ﬁer, believed the universe is inexhaustible and potentially incompre-
hensible to the human mind—that no matter how long or far we look
into the “misty distances”, the universe will not conform to abstrac-
tions. For a diversiﬁer, the details matter more than the simple expla-
nations. Where a uniﬁer prefers abstract structure and the aesthetics
of a uniﬁed theory, the diversiﬁer focuses on the concrete variations
of nature, the exceptions to the theory. 
This dichotomy could be (mis-)interpreted in several ways.
One could read it as equivalent to theoretician/experimenter,
to academia/industry, or to scientist/engineer. Or, taking in a
broader philosophical context: to Platonic/Aristotelian views, Carte-
sian/Baconian science, or analysis vs synthesis as processes for gener-
ating knowledge. The following sections will argue that none of theses exactly isomorphic to Dyson’s dichotomy; but, on deeper reﬂection,
ll provide fascinating perspectives for our own ﬁeld. 
.1. Theoreticians and experimenters? 
On a ﬁrst reading, it could be perceived that Dyson’s uniﬁers are
heoreticians , whilst diversiﬁers are experimenters . This is reinforced
y his naming of the great experimenter Ernest Rutherford as a di-
ersiﬁer. Rutherford was an outstanding experimental physicist, but
ccording to Dyson, disrespectful of academic learning, more inter-
sted in facts than theories. Rutherford was well known for state-
ents such as “If your experiment needs statistics, you ought to have
one a better experiment”, and referring to theoretical physicists he
nce joked “they play games with their symbols, but we turn out the
eal solid facts of nature”. Rutherford’s diversiﬁer perspective on sci-
ntiﬁc research provided new capabilities, such as determining the
ize of an individual atom, or counting the number of atoms in a given
olume of gas. To be clear: his purpose was science , not engineering,
ut he was interested in the “real solid facts of nature”. Dyson states
hat Einstein and Rutherford held such opposing views, greater than
he normal rift between theorist/experimenter, that they could barely
alk to each other—explained by the fact that they held fundamentally
ifferent philosophies on the nature and purpose of science. 
However, assuming Einstein/Rutherford as the deﬁnitive uni-
er/diversiﬁer split does not appear to be Dyson’s intention. The sim-
le mapping of unify = theory and diversify = experiment is far too
aïve. He explicitly names a theoretical physicist, John Wheeler, as
 diversiﬁer. Wheeler (1911–2008) was one of the most proliﬁc and
ccomplished theoretical physicists of the 20th century, a pioneer in
uantum gravity and the theory of nuclear ﬁssion, he also introduced
he term ‘black hole’, and ‘wormhole’ to describe hypothetical tun-
els through space-time. He was also an early advocate of the “an-
hropic principle”—that the laws of physics are ﬁne-tuned for the ex-
stence of life in the universe. However, Wheeler suggested a stronger
xtension, the participatory anthropic principle, in which the laws of
hysics are not primary, but derivative, and brought into being by the
resence of conscious life in the universe. Here, Einstein’s pure re-
uctionist approach to physics, hunting for a single unifying set of
aws, is turned on its head—the laws themselves are mutable , and are
 function of our observation. Thus the search for unifying laws may
e futile, since we cannot observe other laws that may have come
nto existence without us. Of course, it could be that Wheeler saw
 deeper set of developmental governing laws. But, the very fact that
he rest of the physics community was converging on a single unify-
ng theory, and Wheeler challenged their viewpoint by bringing into
he equations the ‘tiny’ detail of their own consciousness, makes him
 diversiﬁer . In Dyson’s words: 
“Among contemporary physicists, John Wheeler is unique in taking
seriously the possibility that the laws of physics may be contingent
upon the presence of life in the Universe.” […] 
“Wheeler’s colleagues love him more than they listen to him. The
physics of the uniﬁers has no room for his subversive thoughts.”
So, now we have a theoretician-diversiﬁer. It is also easy to think
f the converse, a uniﬁer who relies on experimental observation.
harles Darwin’s approach was almost exclusively observational and
mpirical in nature; in his autobiography he reﬂects on his career as
o: 
“Therefore, my success as a man of science, whatever this may have
amounted to, has been determined, as far as I can judge, by complex
and diversiﬁed mental qualities and conditions. Of these the most im-
portant have been […] industry in observing and collecting facts, and
a fair share of invention as well as of common-sense.”[3, p. 144] 
It is widely acknowledged that by the word ‘invention’, Darwin
eant invention of hypotheses that can be experimentally tested.
G. Brown / Pattern Recognition Letters 64 (2015) 11–20 13 
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D  arwin held a uniﬁer mindset, reducing our very existence to the re-
ult of a single principle (natural selection) yet every step of the work
elied on observation and experiment. 
It is equally easy to name an experimental physicist with a uni-
er mindset. Though Dyson did not explicitly name him, one posits
hat James Prescott Joule (1818–1889) would be a typical uniﬁer in
is mind. Joule determined equivalencies between thermal, electri-
al, and mechanical phenomena, through rigorous experimentation.
is principle of energy conservation is not a product of esoteric math-
matics, but careful control of external factors that could have af-
ected his experimental observations. This work uniﬁed numerous
ompeting viewpoints, laying the foundation for the modern the-
ry of thermodynamics. So, we have a theoretician-diversiﬁer, and
n experimenter-uniﬁer, and the converse for each case. 
Theoretician Experimenter 
Uniﬁer Einstein Darwin/Joule 
Diversiﬁer Wheeler Rutherford 
Whilst Dyson makes clear that instances of theorist-diversiﬁers
re possible, it seems to be his contention that in his own ﬁeld they
re rare, and 20th century theoretical physicists are more likely to be
niﬁers. Equivalently, though we have two examples (Darwin/Joule),
ne posits that experimenter-uniﬁers (in any ﬁeld) are rare. Thus, it
ay be that most uniﬁers are theory-oriented, but not all, and most
iversiﬁers are more experimental, but again, not all. 
.2. Academia and industry? 
To underline the nature of his uniﬁer/diversiﬁer dichotomy, Dyson
resents an analogy, rephrasing it in social terms. 
“The ﬁrst academic city in the world was Athens, and the ﬁrst indus-
trial city was Manchester, so I like to use the names of Athens and
Manchester as symbols of the two styles of scientiﬁc thinking.” [1, p.
37] 
He clariﬁes later, 
“The science of Athens emphasises ideas and theories; it tries to ﬁnd
unifying concepts which tie the universe together. The science of
Manchester emphasises facts and things; it tries to explore and ex-
tend our knowledge of nature’s diversity.” [1, p. 40] . 
To clarify, he is not stating that all academics are uniﬁers, nor that
ll of industries are diversiﬁers. Neither is he explicitly stating that
anchester’s industry was the home of the diversiﬁers he refers to.
n fact he refers equally to the practice of science no matter where it
ccurs, within academic walls or in industry. 
“Science belongs to both worlds, but the style of academic science is
different from the style of industrial science. The science of the aca-
demic world tends to be dominated by uniﬁers, while the science of
the industrial world tends to be dominated by diversiﬁers.” [1, p. 36] .
The qualiﬁcation “tends to be” is important here. Whist he says
ndustry “tends to be dominated” by diversiﬁers, it is interesting to
onsider the cause of this—whether diversiﬁer-style science is a func-
ion of industrial requirements . The Manchester exemplar is particu-
arly illuminating in this respect, given a deeper look at its historical
ontext. Manchester, situated in the North of England, was the birth-
lace of the Industrial Revolution, and the growth of its intellectual
apital is well documented by Thackray [4] . In the late 18th century, a
umber of learned societies 2 were founded by a group of dissatisﬁed2 The ﬁrst among which was the Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society 
1781), which ultimately leads to the foundation of Owens College (1851), later re- 
amed The University of Manchester. 
o  
t  
t  
h  ntellectuals driven by a common vision—to escape the constraints
orced upon the North from the wealthy elite in the South of Eng-
and, typiﬁed by men with classical Oxford and Cambridge educa-
ions. Whilst the industrial revolution was an obvious driver of sci-
nce in this period, Thackray argues that the immense scientiﬁc in-
ovation of the age was as much a means for 
“the social legitimation of marginal men, […] the adoption of science
as a means of cultural expression by a new social class” [4, p. 678] . 
Dyson summarises neatly that “ the atmosphere of Manchester was
aturated with contempt for the ancient universities”. The style of sci-
nce in these learned societies (and ultimately the University) was
irrored by these geo-social pressures. 
“Science did ﬂourish in Manchester during the crucial formative years
of the industrial revolution, but […] did not arise in response to the
needs of industrial production. The driving force of the Manchester
scientiﬁc renaissance were not technological and utilitarian; they
were cultural and aesthetic.” [1, p. 38] 
He argues that, although Manchester’s industrial needs were ev-
dent, the diversiﬁer scientiﬁc style was not a strict function of this
eed. Instead it was borne out of a need for cultural distinction from
he traditional Universities; and, in the wider city “to raise the aspi-
ations of leadings citizens to a loftier level”, showing that it was pos-
ible to live in Manchester and still be a gentleman. One element of
yson’s diversiﬁer seems therefore to be a “rebellious” nature, to sit
n opposition to convention, ﬁnding exceptions where others assume
one. 
Dyson names his archetypal diversiﬁer of 19th century Manch-
ster as Ernest Rutherford, whose academic work in understand-
ng the structure of the atom was wholly curiosity-driven, without
hought of immediate applications. Rutherford was well known to
hallenge convention, to ignore elegant theories in favour of observ-
ble facts. This combination of traits seemed to work for him, pro-
iding strong foundations for the emerging ﬁeld of thermodynam-
cs. This of course had great implications for the industrial revolution,
hough the industrial side was in full swing before Rutherford came
long. 
One notable omission from Dyson’s argument is the distinction
etween science and engineering . Given the discussion on Manchester
eing the ﬁrst industrial city, with many aspects of its activity ori-
nted towards engineering, this is surprising. This is also especially
elevant if we are to see whether this applies to Pattern Recognition,
ommonly viewed as a ﬁeld straddling both science and engineering.
.3. Science and engineering? 
It is here we must be careful with our dichotomies. Academia and
ndustry are venues , not practices. Science and engineering are prac-
ices . Unifying and diversifying are styles of practice . These, according
o Dyson, occur in both academia and industry in the practice of sci-
nce, and as will be argued here, also the practice of engineering. 
Dyson made no explicit statements on whether his dichotomy was
ntended to apply only to science, but we can speculate. The debate
ver the deﬁnition of science versus engineering could form an entire
rticle by itself, and an excellent example is to be found within this
pecial issue [5] . Acknowledging this, but for the purposes of simplic-
ty, I will adopt a distinction as so: 
science is a practice primarily concerned with truth , 
engineering is a practice primarily concerned with utility . 
A naïve step would be to assume uniﬁers = scientists; however,
yson’s concept of a uniﬁer does not seem to preclude the possibility
f them having an engineering mindset. A uniﬁer is someone who
hinks about the relations between artefacts, rather than artefacts
hemselves. A uniﬁer is, like Einstein and Darwin, concerned with
ow much of the universe can be brought under their metaphorical
14 G. Brown / Pattern Recognition Letters 64 (2015) 11–20 
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sumbrella. One can imagine an engineer taking on the challenge of
building a bridge, but with a uniﬁer’s view. This engineer would be
concerned with characteristics of bridges that make them all strong,
with the physics of how they can be modelled in a variety of situa-
tions, as opposed to the nuances of how one particular bridge should
be built. In our own ﬁeld of Computer Science, a uniﬁer-engineer
may be concerned with building frameworks of software/hardware or
mathematics, for others to use, incorporating as many general prin-
ciples as possible. This may sacriﬁce functionality in favour of having
a clean single interface to a number of underlying tools. A diversiﬁer-
engineer in our ﬁeld is more concerned with pushing limits, testing
when and where individual techniques do or do not work—for ex-
ample, they may demonstrate how parameter settings can be found
automatically using eﬃcient mechanisms imported from other ﬁelds,
or evaluating scenarios where the mode of application for a predic-
tive model is not so clear-cut. 
In conclusion, Dyson’s dichotomy easily applies across the sci-
ence/engineering boundary. Whether one is interested in the pursuit
of pure scientiﬁc knowledge, or of more practical goals, this does not
limit a person to one style of research thinking. 
2.4. Summary 
Unpicking Dyson’s dichotomy, a uniﬁer is someone who is com-
fortable making abstractions or assumptions in order to reach a
broader conclusion; where uniﬁers tolerate abstractions, diversiﬁers
question them, and pursue the details; uniﬁers emphasise similari-
ties , whilst diversiﬁers emphasise differences . Both these styles can be
followed in academia or in industry, by theorist or experimentalist,
by scientist or engineer. Whilst mathematics is a strong element of a
uniﬁer’s toolbox, it is not the deﬁning element. 
The uniﬁer’s assumptions may be questionable, but the reason-
ing process followed from them is not. This approach allows great
leaps of thought, by abstracting away from potentially ﬂawed obser-
vations to an idealised form. Diversiﬁers on the other hand, cannot
ignore the concrete variations of nature. To them, compromise or
conformity to dogma seems alien, ignoring the observable facts as
they can plainly be seen. They love the details, they see and enable
things uniﬁers cannot, simply by persistence, fertile imagination, and
systematic thought. 
Given this breakdown of the concepts, some parallels to estab-
lished dichotomies in classical and modern philosophy can be seen.
In particular the idea of unquestionable reasoning from base assump-
tions is effectively the deductive process, championed by Descartes,
and the idea of abstracting away details to have an “idealised form”
is reminiscent of Plato’s worldview. In the following section we will
discuss these parallels. 
3. Parallels to philosophical literature 
3.1. Plato’s forms versus Aristotle’s empiricism? 
Dyson states that the science of Athens (uniﬁers) emphasises
“ideas and theories”, whereas the science of Manchester (diversiﬁers)
emphasises “facts and things”. The most immediate philosophical
parallel here is Plato versus Aristotle. 
At his most fundamental, Plato’s position was that, progress to-
wards new knowledge only begins when we come to think of our
world experiences as ﬂawed and possibly irrelevant, and it is only by
processes of abstract thinking that we generate true understanding.
Plato believed that humans were superior, born with innate knowl-
edge, from which the full truth and knowledge of the universe (in-
cluding theories of society, justice and government) could be reached
by deduction alone, thus reference to empirical data was unneces-
sary, even distracting. Aristotle on the other hand believed inductive processes could be
sed to establish ﬁrst principles, combined with abstractions only
hen justiﬁed, from which deduction could be trusted and results
ater tested. This ﬁts better with modern scientists arguably of the
niﬁer mindset—Hawking, Feynman, and Dyson himself, proposed
heories that can be tested, built on the foundations of observable
henomena. Feynman once delivered a memorable speech on the
eaning of the modern scientiﬁc method: 
“If it disagrees with experiment, it’s WRONG. In that simple statement
is the key to science. It doesn’t make any difference ho w beautiful
your guess is, it doesn’t matter how smart you are, who made the
guess, or what his name is. If it disagrees with experiment, it’s wrong.
That’s all there is to it.”[6] 
Whilst Feynman’s Nobel prize-winning work (Quantum Electro-
ynamics) undoubtedly involved a “uniﬁer” perspective on physics,
e did not require the level of abstraction in thought that Plato would
ave insisted upon. On the other hand, Aristotle’s writing on science
natural philosophy) was wholly qualitative, he simply did not have
ccess to quantitative tools like clocks or thermometers to measure
he universe. As a consequence Aristotle was observational but not
trictly in the sense of modern scientiﬁc method. Thus, in his own
emporal context, Aristotle was probably a diversiﬁer, but the details
hat would be scrutinised by a modern diversiﬁer were perhaps un-
ntentionally glossed over by the Aristotelean worldview. 
.2. Cartesians and Baconians? 
Almost at the outset of his essay, Dyson seems to equate his di-
hotomy with Cartesian versus Baconian science: 
“Historians of science are accustomed to call these two traditions in
science Cartesian and Baconian, since Descartes was the great uniﬁer
and Bacon the great diversiﬁer at the birth of modern science in the
seventeenth century.” [1, p. 40] 
However it is doubtful that Dyson believes these are exact syn-
nyms for his terminology. In later a communication he states that
nly “roughly speaking, uniﬁers are following the tradition of Descartes,
iversiﬁers are following the tradition of Bacon” [7] . The “rough” corre-
pondence between uniﬁer/diversiﬁer and Cartesian/Baconian is sup-
orted by further unpicking of the concepts. 
Descartes followed the rationalist view, that the universe has an
nherently logical structure, and its entirety could be deduced from
rst principles. The belief in the strength of the deductive process,
nd a belief that there exists an underlying logical structure to pur-
ue, are strong uniﬁer traits. However, the deﬁning tenet of Descartes’
hilosophy was his Method of Doubt . Descartes believed in the inher-
nt superiority of reason over sensory experiences. Any sensory expe-
ience could be doubted, but pure deductive reasoning could not, so
ong as the premises were taken to be true. This mistrust of observa-
ional science may occur in uniﬁers, but does not transfer over to all
hose we could imagine. The work of James Joule resulted in reducing
ature to a few “general principles which will explain everything”,
.e. principles for understanding the translation of mechanical energy
o heat energy, leaving the universe a little simpler than he found
t, yet his approach was critically reliant on rigorous experimental
bservations. 
On the other hand, Bacon was clear on his need for experimental
bservation, applying the inductive process to produce new knowl-
dge based ﬁrmly on the real world. Bacon’s view held little space
or theories without some experimental grounding—he stated clearly
hat mathematics should be used “only to give deﬁniteness to natural
hilosophy, not to generate or give it birth.” (Novum Organum XCVI,
620). This places him far from the uniﬁer camp, where abstractions
nd mathematics are often used to motivate and give birth the next
tage of investigation. 
G. Brown / Pattern Recognition Letters 64 (2015) 11–20 15 
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tA further important aspect of Bacon’s philosophy was the eco-
omic impact of science. Bacon’s era was one where the British Em-
ire was emerging, a time of immense economic growth throughout
he 16th/17th century. He demands that natural philosophy (science)
hould be more than merely contemplative, but should be active, put
o use to serve the state, not merely hedonistic but should be a plat-
orm for business and economic growth. He was a strong supporter
hat it could provide economic impact in this manner, though he had
 long term viewpoint of returns happening in decades rather than
hort term engineering aims. So, a strong element of Bacon’s philoso-
hy appears to require economic impact. This seems to be a common
iversiﬁer trait, but by no means a requirement; the earlier example
f John Wheeler serves to illustrate this, and many of Rutherford’s
arly observations on the structure of the atom had no immediate
pplication. 
.3. The analytic/synthetic distinction 
A controversial idea of the past century in philosophy has been
he distinction between analytic and synthetic statements [8] . Here
e provide a brief discussion, though a fuller treatment is outside
he scope of this article. A statement of the form “S is P”, is analytic
f the predicate P is contained within the subject S, that is, the state-
ent is true in virtue of its own meaning . The example made famous
y Kant was “all bachelors are unmarried”—the term bachelor means
o be unmarried. On the other hand, a synthetic statement is one such
s “all bachelors are unhappy”, where the predicate is not necessar-
ly contained in the subject, and to ascertain its truth requires some
nformation beyond the meaning of the words. 
Kant argued for a third category, synthetic a priori statements—
ere the predicate is not contained within the subject, but the state-
ent is necessarily true and does not require any further information
o conﬁrm it as such. Kant asserts that all of mathematics is in this
ategory. If we take an example from our own ﬁeld—a Kalman ﬁl-
er is a special case of a Gaussian Process. Rephrasing this, we have
hat a “KF is a GP”—clearly true, and not requiring sensory experi-
nce to conﬁrm. Additionally, the deﬁnition of a KF in no way uses
 GP as a deﬁning component, thus we consider this is a synthetic
 priori statement. Whomsoever was the ﬁrst to notice this (KF = GP)
ould certainly be regarded as a “uniﬁer”—re-interpreting one Ma-
hine Learning model as another, showing how a single principle can
nite the two bodies of literature. Could it be that uniﬁers are more
re-disposed to making synthetic a priori statements? At present, the
nswer to this is unclear. Certainly if we take the strictest view of the
ork we do—it all comes down to a mathematical statement or set of
tatements (i.e. algorithm) executed on a computer. 
Kant [8] referred to analytic statements as clarifying or explicating
ur knowledge, or in other words, making explicit what was once im-
licit. Similarly, he referred to synthetic statements as augmenting or
xtending knowledge, that is, introducing new information that was
ot contained in the subject S in any way. These two styles – clari-
ying versus extending – certainly bear a passing resemblance to the
oncepts of unifying versus diversifying . However, to categorise them
trictly as such would be to say an act of unifying never extends our
nowledge, and Einstein certainly did extend our understanding of
he universe. A full in-depth treatment of the analytic/synthetic dis-
inction is outside the scope of this article, but is certainly something
orth pursuing in future work. 
.4. Summary: the balance between uniﬁers and diversiﬁers 
Perhaps then, the uniﬁer–diversiﬁer split is best seen as a spec-
rum . The uniﬁers (e.g. Einstein) are following a direction that bears
ome similarities to Plato’s worldview, though of course modern
cience bows to experimental tests of its validity—something Plato
ould never accept. The diversiﬁers are somewhat Baconian, thoughithout Bacon’s strict need for economic impact. The grey area be-
ween uniﬁer/diversiﬁer seems to be best characterised by the Aris-
otlean viewpoint. 
If we look at the space of people holding the diversiﬁer mind-
et, it seems it may be slightly more full of experimenters than the-
rists, probably slightly more engineers than scientists, and proba-
ly slightly more industrial than academic. The space of uniﬁers is
oughly the complement, but none of these individual dichotomies is
somorphic to Dyson’s concept. 
However, Dyson does perceive a deﬁnite imbalance between uni-
ers and diversiﬁers in different ﬁelds, and this may well hold true
or Pattern Recognition also. He argues that the uniﬁers have dom-
nated physics for most of the 20th century. In contrast, he believes
hat biology has enjoyed a “healthier balance,” where although it is
he case that diversiﬁers have dominated, when a uniﬁer like Darwin
r Hamilton comes along, he is not ignored, but celebrated. Dyson re-
inds us that in biology, Darwin’s work is celebrated as a milestone
nifying framework, but such occurrences are rare—the working lives
f 99 out of 100 biologists consist of investigating and manipulating
he complex behaviour patterns of particular species or biochemical
athways. A modern perspective on this divide is given by Jogalekar
9] . 
In a controversial point, Dyson states his belief that the uniﬁers
re most likely to be remembered in history: 
“it is true in general that the very greatest scientists in each discipline
are uniﬁers. This is especially true in physics.”
However, given his later comments, one posits that Dyson intends
he term “greatest” here to mean in the sense of fame/notoriety, as
pposed to ability or impact. He certainly does not try to downplay
he signiﬁcance of the diversiﬁer stance and, in his own work, en-
ages in both styles of work. He provides an interesting account re-
erring to his work to unify the ﬁeld of Quantum Electrodynamics: 
“When I did my most important piece of work […] I had consciously
in mind a metaphor to describe what I was doing. The metaphor was
bridge-building. Tomonaga and Schwinger had built solid founda-
tions on one side of a river of ignorance. Feynman had built solid
foundations on the other side, and my job was to design and build
the cantilevers reaching out over the water until they met in the mid-
dle.”[10] 
So here, Dyson explicitly thinks of himself in a unifying role. In
nother communication [11] he recounts his discussions on Quan-
um ElectroDynamics with Richard P. Feynman, who was apparently
bsessed with ﬁnding a unifying theory of the large (gravity) and
mall (nuclear forces). In contrast, Dyson was comfortable with more
han one set of equations, each useful at different scales. Referencing
ödel’s theorem says: 
“in the last hundred years of physics, uniﬁers have had things too
much their own way. […] I hope that the notion of a ﬁnal statement
of the laws of physics will prove as illusory as the notion of a formal
decision process for all of mathematics. If it should turn out that the
whole of physical reality can be described by a ﬁnite set of equations,
I would be disappointed.”
So here he is quite clear that he also emphasises with a slight di-
ersiﬁer viewpoint, that not everything can be brought under a sin-
le metaphorical umbrella. Whilst Dyson clearly thinks that the great
dvances of 20th century physics are due to the dominant trend of
niﬁers, he clearly states his ﬁnal position, 
“every science needs for its healthy growth a creative balance be-
tween uniﬁers and diversiﬁers”
With this more clearly elucidated, we will consider how some of
hese issues transfer to the Pattern Recognition ﬁeld. 
16 G. Brown / Pattern Recognition Letters 64 (2015) 11–20 
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3 Thanks to Fabio Roli for suggesting this metaphor. 4. Unifying and diversifying in pattern recognition 
The previous sections have explored various subtle interpreta-
tions of the terms “uniﬁer” and “diversiﬁer”. One element made very
clear is that uniﬁers favour simplicity in their work. Dyson seems
to equate this with a certain beauty in the theory or experimental
setup—in physics, mathematical beauty is a key element in the pur-
suit of a Grand Uniﬁed Theory for the ﬁeld. In this section we will
address these issues for Pattern Recognition: ﬁrstly exploring the
concept of beauty, and then the idea of a Grand Uniﬁed Theory. Fi-
nally, we will consider how these two competing pressures of unify-
ing/diversifying balance against each other over long time periods. 
4.1. The pursuit of beauty in our work? 
Whilst Dyson does discuss the idea of beauty in theories, several
prominent physicists have stated their belief more boldly: 
“a beautiful or elegant theory is more likely to be right than a theory
that is inelegant.” [12] 
In the ﬁeld of physics, this pursuit of aesthetics has proved excep-
tionally fruitful. Dyson however does not believe this holds true for
all ﬁelds of science: 
“Mathematical beauty was key to the discovery of the laws of na-
ture […] That somehow seemed to work beautifully in physics, but
it doesn’t seem to work in biology […] The fact is that mathematics
is useful for biology only in a very humble way, essentially computer
science […] making simulations of complicated systems […] not as a
creator for insight.” [13] 
To explain the concept of mathematical beauty is challenging, just
as it is challenging to explain the feeling an individual gets from a
piece of artwork. The great physicist Murray Gell-Mann said that
something is beautiful if it can be explained concisely in terms of
mathematics we already have. Richard Feynman explained it as the
quality of a result that ﬁts like the last piece in a puzzle, either mak-
ing everything else seem obvious in hindsight, or providing startling
new predictions that are borne out in experiment. 
Whilst it seems to be justiﬁable that in physics, mathematical
beauty is the key to truth, in PR we are not necessarily always seek-
ing truth —but sometimes simply utility . So, is mathematical beauty
the key to progress: either to discovery of new truths, or new util-
ity, in our ﬁeld? Ockham’s razor is the obvious discussion point here.
The pursuit of simplicity has clearly been a useful practical rule for
model selection. In terms of theories/concepts, it has also been a use-
ful post hoc organisational tool—cleaning up areas after their inven-
tion, sometimes yielding small gaps for new work. However the prin-
ciple has yet to prove its worth at the same magnitude observed in
physics, a tool of discovery for entirely new areas of study. 
Symmetry is a form of beauty which has been a crucial tool in the
understanding of fundamental physics. The most recent high proﬁle
example of this is the discovery of the Higgs Boson, predicted to be
observable in the Large Hadron Collider at a particular energy level.
This prediction was made in 1964, for the simple reason that it would
make for a beautiful mathematical symmetry. There may be algo-
rithms we consider beautiful in retrospect—but this principle, of dis-
covery via aesthetics , has not yet been so convincingly demonstrated
in PR. There has not been a ﬂood of predictions in the form “there
should exist a learning algorithm with generalisation error x% ”. The
only instance even vaguely like this (that I know of) is the Boosting
family of algorithms—the existence of which was predicted by stud-
ies in computational complexity theory [14] , and discovered later by
Schapire [15] . Our equivalent to the headline-grabbing Higgs predic-
tion would be a prophecy of the form: “if you create a deep neural net-
work with between 10 15 and 10 16 connections, a phase transition should
occur and enable a new level of machine intelligence”. Thereafter, sev-ral billion of EU funding would be directed towards tunnelling under
witzerland to build a neural net big enough. But it has not happened.
It is arguable that a far more fruitful “tool of discovery” in our ﬁeld
as been inter-disciplinarity . Many of our best optimisation schemes
ome from mathematics (e.g. simplex) or physics (e.g. simulated an-
ealing), many of our best models come from biological analogy
e.g. convolutional neural nets), and many of our best methodologies
ome from statistics (e.g. bootstrap). Of course, this may be an arte-
act of this stage in our (short) history, and in 50 years the pursuit of
ymmetry-breaking might turn out useful for artiﬁcial intelligence,
ut who knows. 
Given this inherent interdisciplinarity, it is instructive to question
hether our subject is on a path towards a ‘uniﬁed theory’ as many
eople believe is the case for physics. Or indeed, if it is ‘uniﬁable’ at
ll. Even if the answer to this is negative, are there individual ele-
ents of our practice that could be uniﬁed? What are the pros and
ons of unifying/diversifying in our ﬁeld? 
.2. A uniﬁed theory of pattern recognition? 
Is it the case that there exists a single uniﬁed theory of Pattern
ecognition, towards which we are converging? I believe this idea can
e dismissed immediately almost without controversy. For one, even
f a Grand Uniﬁed Theory exists for physics, we know that we are not
escribing that. It is true that we are in some sense using inference to
redict the behaviour of the universe (e.g. whether a person will buy
 book on Amazon or not), but we are modelling at a level of abstrac-
ion several dozen layers above where String Theory is working. And,
ultiple abstractions can hold true without problem, providing dif-
erent overlapping and mutually reinforcing viewpoints. The best way
o model something is not necessarily at the deepest level at which
e understand it. For example, ﬂuid mechanics is a well established
iscipline, allowing us to predict how water waves break against a
all; the calculations work almost perfectly, using the assumption
hat the water is a continuum, even though we understand the water
o be made of atoms, or digging deeper, little vibrating strings in 11
imensions. There of course exist almost religious factions that try to
onvince everybody else that their method of data analysis and infer-
nce is the One True Path , but ultimately, with incisive questioning,
hey can usually be brought to a more pragmatic perspective, at least
n the short term. 
The pragmatic viewpoint says that different mechanisms, theo-
ies and implementations of intelligence will be useful in different
cenarios. In this light, it can be believed that we may get pockets of
niﬁcation, but no over-arching theory to unify us all. There is cer-
ainly no shortage of attempts—a quick Google search reveals recent
apers in a common style: 
• A Unifying Framework for Statistical Relational Learning 
• Rule Evaluation Measures: A Unifying View 
• A Unifying View of Multiple Kernel Learning 
• A Unifying Framework for Information Theoretic Feature Selection
Just as Dyson believes that different sets of equations would be
seful at different scales of experience, so it is likely that different
heories of inference and data modelling will be appropriate for dif-
erent problem scenarios, and at different scales and types of data,
ifferent aesthetics will become apparent. 
.3. Unifying/diversifying as part of an evolutionary process 
In any ﬁeld, unifying and diversifying behave according to a kind
f evolutionary process, 3 where the units of evolution are memes :
deas, behaviours or styles that spread from person to person within a
G. Brown / Pattern Recognition Letters 64 (2015) 11–20 17 
c  
t  
T  
c  
k  
u  
i  
m  
m  
t  
d
 
e  
u  
f  
a  
r  
g  
b  
o
 
b  
t  
b  
p  
w  
s  
s  
o  
a  
a
5
 
d  
t  
i  
o  
s  
q  
p  
o  
c  
s  
t
 
t  
t  
i  
p  
q  
e  
a  
b  
t
 
n  
v  
a  
c  
a  
h  
e  
w  
A  
f  
W  
c  
u
 
s  
m  
m  
s
 
t  
c  
e  
a  
m  
a  
b  
o  
e  
s  
a  
p  
m
 
a
 
 
 
 
m  
t  
c  
R  
l  
b  
t  
u  
u  
t  
d  
p  
p  
p
6
 
r  
s  
t  
h
 
c  
t  
o
 
s  
t  
t  
d  
c  
4 The author confesses to being in this category for a good while. ulture. In PR, the Bayesian and Kernel memes gained particular trac-
ion from about 20 0 0 onwards, and are arguably of a unifying ﬂavour.
hey have both successfully abstracted several techniques to special
ases of their respective methodologies, enabling new insights, e.g.
ernel PCA. Whilst these have proved immensely powerful, when a
nifying meme does not serve to progress science as rapidly as it has
n the past, its dominance in the culture is displaced, and diversifying
emes appear. The recent meme of deep learning seems to be very
uch in a diversifying ﬂavour, without a single aesthetically pleasing
heory to explain it, yet clearly providing results of utility in several
omains. 
The evolutionary pressures are complex, existing at various lev-
ls of granularity in a ﬁeld. Coarse-grained aspects of the ﬁeld can be
niﬁed under a common societal challenge, such as the recent trend
or Big Data , whilst at the same time ﬁner-grained aspects of the ﬁeld
re diversiﬁed to cope with the new challenges. Sometimes results are
ediscovered, but put in a new light given that other topics have pro-
ressed in the meantime—results once seen as diversifying, can later
e seen to serve a uniﬁcation. The ﬁeld progresses only with the blend
f these pressures: too much of either one will hinder progress. 
Taking this long-term viewpoint, a meaningful diversiﬁcation can
e exceptionally healthy. The ﬁeld of artiﬁcial intelligence underwent
he ultimate diversiﬁcation from the 1980s onward, documented well
y Cristianini [16] . Looking back at the Dartmouth Conference [2] , the
rimary goal was to create intelligent beings, and it was imagined this
as only a decade or so away. Over half a century later, we have sub-
ub-subﬁelds—for example, adversarial classiﬁcation, as a subﬁeld of
upervised learning, as a subﬁeld of machine learning, as a subﬁeld
f AI. This diversiﬁcation enabled questions we never imagined 1955,
nd created a generation of technology that has become indispens-
ble to everyday life. 
. What do uniﬁers/diversiﬁers do in PR? 
Uniﬁers like to explore the connectedness of ideas. They prefer to
iscover the relationships between existing scientiﬁc artefacts, rather
han create new ones. In our case, these are algorithms, mathemat-
cal constructions, and their implementations, whether in hardware
r software. When uniﬁers create, they create artefacts at the inter-
ection of existing ones, so as to see their connection. As a conse-
uence, they write papers which bring people together, cross disci-
line boundaries for the purpose of reinterpreting their primary ﬁeld
f study, and have a broad view of the research landscape. It could be
onjectured that uniﬁers tend to publish less frequently than diver-
iﬁers, taking more time to integrate the various concepts they bring
ogether. 
Diversiﬁers on the other hand enjoy exploration and invention,
hey have a narrower focus on the research landscape at any one
ime, or multiple narrow foci. They push limits and ﬁgure out what
s and is not possible. This was precisely Rutherford’s achievement,
ushing the boundaries of our understanding of the atom. As a conse-
uence, they innovate more, posing questions not previously consid-
red, often by importing ideas across a discipline boundary. They cre-
te artefacts with utility, not only in the immediate engineering sense
ut also in that they highlight problems, chinks in the armour of a
heory. 
Both groups have the capability to inspire new directions, create
ew ﬁelds—but they do it in different ways. Uniﬁers provide a new
iewpoint on existing literature, showing gaps, enabling meaningful
nalysis of properties, providing new languages which can express
omputational artefacts at the junction of several others. Diversiﬁers
ddress challenging new domains and questions that current work
as simply not considered; they start slow, often with heuristic (but
ffective) approaches and accumulate a fan-base of loyal followers
ho slowly reﬁne these, ﬁguring out what works and what does not.
s may be obvious, the two groups provide fuel for each other—oneollows the other in a never-ending cycle of interleaving innovation.
here the uniﬁer deﬁnes a framework, the diversiﬁer ﬁnds an ex-
eption. When the diversiﬁer ﬁnds suﬃciently many exceptions, the
niﬁer sees commonalities and patterns for a new framework. 
As we have stated at the start of Section 2.3 , unifying and diver-
ifying are styles of practice . As such, each can be done badly , causing
ore harm than good. Whilst it is tempting in this essay to take the
iddle ground and avoid offence, here I will not, and outline down-
ides of each practice. 
Novice uniﬁers 4 can be dangerous. They often stumble for a long
ime, seeing patterns where there are none, over-egging the signiﬁ-
ance of their ‘frameworks’. Uniﬁcation can be sterile —bringing sev-
ral ideas under a common umbrella, but ending up with strained
nalogies and relationships between the ideas, and ultimately closing
ore doors than it opens. Claims to uniﬁcation can be little more than
 categorisation of the ideas: a literature review with a solid backbone,
ut not enabling invention of new ideas, or meaningful explanation
f existing ones. There are downsides to the uniﬁer stance in general,
ven if done “correctly”. Why should we force others to adopt the
ame perspective as our own? If we attempt to cast everything into
 single mould then, whilst aesthetically pleasing, it will mean com-
romises have to be made. In this way, doors will be closed on young
inds exploring the literature for the ﬁrst time. 
As stated eloquently by Langley [17] , too much diversiﬁcation can
lso be bad for a ﬁeld: 
“…diversiﬁcation also has its dangers. Subdisciplines can emerge that
focus on one goal or evaluation scheme to the exclusion of others, and
similarities among methods can be obscured by different notations
and terminology.” [17] 
It is common to see papers offering ‘novel’ methods with an im-
ensely complex computational pipeline, and many parameter set-
ings left unjustiﬁed; or worse, nuances of the implementation left
ompletely unreported. Though this article is focused on Pattern
ecognition, it is fair to note that similarly vague work appears in re-
ated communities [18] . These papers can generally be characterised
y the phrase “my classiﬁer gets higher accuracy than your classiﬁer”,
hough results often cannot be reproduced as they depend on those
nspeciﬁed nuances. The best one can say in this situation is congrat-
lations to the authors for ﬁnding the three or four datasets on which
heir method was successful. It is diﬃcult to see what can be done to
iscourage this, apart from reﬁning the unspoken rules of acceptable
ractice in our ﬁeld. One can only hope that further standards of re-
roducible research will inﬁltrate the community, and allow genuine
rogress rather than illusory [19] . 
. Who drives the paradigm shifts of pattern recognition? 
Kuhn [20] presents a treatise on the nature and reasons behind
evolutions in scientiﬁc understanding. In this, he discusses how new
cientiﬁc concepts bring about revolutions in a ﬁeld. Kuhn proposes
hat all scientiﬁc revolutions follow a similar pattern, described by
is ‘paradigm shift’ cycle ( Fig. 1 ). 
An interesting question is who drives the transitions around this
ycle? Is it the uniﬁers, coming up with fundamental new theorems
o unify the state of the art? Or the diversiﬁers, challenging popular
pinion with new observations/phenomena? 
Dyson claims that Kuhn’s vision of this is too narrow—that tran-
itions are brought into being only by uniﬁers, coming up with new
heorems. He calls this a concept-driven revolution . He expands upon
his view in a book titled “The Sun, The Genome, and The Internet”, [21] ,
iscussing how tools are an equal (if not greater) inﬂuence on the re-
ent revolutions in science. Dyson takes a very broad viewpoint on
18 G. Brown / Pattern Recognition Letters 64 (2015) 11–20 
Fig. 1. Kuhn’s paradigm shift cycle. So-called ‘normal’ science precedes anomalies in 
observation, followed by a crisis of understanding, then a scientiﬁc ‘revolution’ where 
new ideas are adopted by mainstream science, and a new paradigm begins. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e  
w  
ﬁ  
g  
t  
t  
p  
t  
t  
L  
p  
n  
s  
f
 
e  
s  
c
 
b  
e  
u  
t  
m  
a  
e  
l  
t
7
 
L  
i  
e  
w  
w
 
t  
o  
r
8
 
p  
i  
c  
d  
s  
f
 
 
 
 
t  
r  
r  
a  
y
5 http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/˜gbrown/research/langley.pdf . the deﬁnition of a tool, as might be suggested by the book title, he
considers the sun, the genome, and the internet, all as tools for sci-
ence. In his own words: 
“a scientiﬁc tool is not only considered to be something that strength-
ens our senses or is useful in taking measurements, but also as an aid
to our understanding” [21, p. 51] 
Dyson points out that new tools (created by diversiﬁers) enable
observation of new phenomena, which possibly conﬂict with previ-
ous theories—pushing the ﬁeld into the ‘anomalies’ and then ‘crisis’
phase. In addition, the transition back round to normal science is very
often enabled by tools which observe and manipulate data to resolve
the anomalies—the new theories play a relatively minor role in the
process. He proposes that physics was dominated by concept-driven
revolutions prior to the 20th century, but beyond the 1920s it was not
possible to conduct experiments in isolation, and tool-driven revolu-
tions took over—when tools like Electron Microscopes and the Large
Hadron Collider enabled new paradigms of understanding. 
Returning the discussion to Pattern Recognition, we had a
concept-driven revolution in the early 1990s, when statistical and
data-driven modelling began to dominate. We are possibly about to
transition into a tool-driven revolution, with the availability of tools
like Kinect, and a new wearable computing industry with the Apple
Watch and imitators—using many embedded sensors that will make
inferences based on observations during the day. Embedded sensors
and computing are disappearing into the fabric of life, as so many
Sci-Fi movies have it. This generation of embedded intelligent sen-
sors will need software, and it will be the intellectual descendants of
those reading this article that write it. Other non-obvious examples of
ML tools are: approximate inference algorithms, multi-core comput-
ers and GPUs, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, toolkits such as Weka and
libSVM, and of course APIs that open up sources of data unavailable
to most people, such as Twitter feeds. 
Very occasionally, single, powerful tools come along that drive
an entire revolution. These enable the ﬁeld to both ask and answer
questions that would have been previously inconceivable, just as the
physics of black holes would be inconceivable to the ancient Atheni-
ans without modern day radio telescopes. Dyson has recently specu-
lated [13] that the progress of artiﬁcial intelligence is fundamentally
limited until critical new tools (analogue computing machines) are
properly developed. 
7. Related work in pattern recognition 
Whilst we may never have a truly “uniﬁed theory of inference”,
there are a number of technical elements of our ﬁeld which could
beneﬁt from a little uniﬁcation; in classic papers, Breiman [22] and
Langley [17] present ideas along this line. With over a decade since
Breiman’s paper, and a quarter-century since Langley’s, it seems an
interesting time to revisit their words. 
7.1. Breiman’s two cultures 
Breiman [22] discusses two cultures of statistical modelling: data
modelling versus algorithmic modelling. For Breiman, “data mod-lling” means considering the form of the problem/data one is faced
ith, then thinking of a parametric class of mathematical models, and
tting the parameters. This is epitomised by linear and logistic re-
ressions, and procedures like LASSO. The models are mathematically
ractable and elegant, and have direct (if questionable) mappings of
heir structure to phenomena in the problem domain—Breiman pro-
oses that their use accounts for 98% of the working lives of all statis-
icians. The ‘algorithmic modelling’ culture is epitomised by decision
rees, neural nets, SVMs and other terms familiar to us in Machine
earning. These models make no claim to reﬂect the structure of the
roblem in their own structure. A node in a neural net or an RBF ker-
el is simply a good way of ﬁtting the data, as opposed to being a
ymbol for a particular real-world event. He claims that these account
or 2% of all statisticians. 
Breiman argues three main points, that the overuse of data mod-
ls has: led to irrelevant theory and questionable conclusions; kept
tatisticians from using more suitable procedures; and kept statisti-
ians from working on exciting new domains. 
In the years since Breiman’s paper, many of these boundaries have
een crossed. Many of the techniques Breiman calls algorithmic mod-
ls are now known as computational statistics, and are in common
se in both communities. There is still the hardcore of both the statis-
ics and ML communities that hold fast to the aesthetics of certain
odelling approaches, and these are slowly dropping their restrictive
ssumptions, becoming just as strong in practice as any method. Nev-
rtheless, Breiman’s paper is a thought-provoking read over a decade
ater; and, with its pragmatic view, encourages these two communi-
ies to unify their goals and practices. 
.2. Langley’s seven dichotomies 
Langley [17] wrote a striking editorial for an issue of Machine
earning Journal, on the topic of unifying machine learning as it stood
n the late 1980s. He discusses seven apparent dichotomies that had
merged at the time, stating that “long term progress will only occur if
e can ﬁnd ways to unify these apparently competing views into a single
hole”. 
For the interested reader, an online Appendix 5 to this article con-
ains a detailed analysis of each of these seven dichotomies (from my
wn perspective) and the extent to which I believe they have been
esolved over the past 25 years. 
. The value of the dichotomy 
What is the value of Dyson’s uniﬁer/diversiﬁer dichotomy? Is it
redictive , in the sense that it may inform proﬁtable new directions
n research? Does it give an understanding of our own actions, suc-
esses/failures? What is a healthy balance of the two for PR? To ad-
ress these questions, it is in fact easier to ﬁrst address the more ab-
tract question—what is the value of philosophy in general? A power-
ul answer to this is presented by Russell [23, chapter XV] . 
“The study of physical science is to be recommended […] because of
the effect on mankind in general. This utility does not belong to phi-
losophy. If the study of philosophy has any value […] it must be only
indirectly, through its effects upon the lives of those who study it.”
Russell suggests that the beneﬁts of philosophical thought show
hemselves ﬁrstly in the lives of those who study it, and only indi-
ectly in the lives of others who they interact with. If philosophical
eﬂection is undertaken by scientists, this enables more considered
nd reﬂective practice in whatever ﬁeld they happen to occupy. Many
ears later, Russell summarised his views as, 
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 “the man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life impris-
oned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habit-
ual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have
grown up in his mind without the co-operation or consent of his de-
liberate reason.” [24] 
Can philosophy in general inform proﬁtable new directions in PR
esearch? Pelillo and Scantamburlo [25] present a post hoc example,
iscussing the essentialist viewpoint in philosophy. Essentialism is the
iew that entities in the world have inherent, essential and immutable
roperties, by which they can be described. Pelillo and Scantamburlo
25] discuss how dissimilarity measures in PR sit in direct opposition
o this philosophical view, in that an entity is best described by its
elation (similarities) to other entities. I suggest an speculative ex-
ension, that evaluation metrics in our ﬁeld should be considered in
he same manner. The evaluation metric is not something essential to
 predictive model—it is something subjective, imposed by humans,
or particular tasks, at a particular point in time, in a particular con-
ext. Perhaps merging some ideas from multi-objective optimisation
ith the theory of ranking measures might prove fruitful in this di-
ection. 
But, what beneﬁt is the uniﬁer/diversiﬁer dichotomy? Can it give
n understanding of our own actions, successes/failures? Possibly,
es. This may come by reﬂections on previous successes/failures, and
hat character they have. If an individual sees on reﬂection that most
f their successes have come from a diversifying mindset, they may
e able to direct actions accordingly in the future. As in most areas of
ife, raising awareness of one’s emotions and actions is usually prof-
table. 
What is a healthy balance of unifying and diversifying? This is
 diﬃcult question. For one, a ‘healthy balance’ is ill-deﬁned, and
ven if it wasn’t, it would be different at different scales of organi-
ation. The individual researcher, their research team, their academic
chool or institution, all the way up to a nation’s research budget—
ach will have different em phases depending on complex factors.
ven so, the dichotomy might be useful as an analytical tool—asking
t each of these scales, how much effort is being placed into four dif-
erent areas: unifying in science/engineering, and diversifying in sci-
nce/engineering. Whilst this is sure to be a controversial point of
iew, and I do not suppose to know the best way to manage an entire
ountry’s research budget, it is a thought-provoking concept. 
. Conclusion 
The question originally posed for this paper was “can Dyson’s uni-
er/diversiﬁer dichotomy apply in the Pattern Recognition ﬁeld?”.
e conclude that the answer is yes , but in a subtly different way.
here do exist pure uniﬁers and pure diversiﬁers, just as in physics,
owever, they are rare in our ﬁeld. Most people in PR sit on the spec-
rum between the two: keen to expand the scope of our ﬁeld (diver-
ifying) but equally keen to ﬁnd aesthetically pleasing results link-
ng them to other researchers (unifying). Many researchers can adopt
nifying perspectives one day, and be diversifying the next. 
However, I conjecture that this situation may change with time.
yson argued that both theories and tools drive scientiﬁc revolutions
21] . Physics has been maturing its arsenal of theories and tools for
undreds of years longer than us. As such, the accessibility of theories
nd tools is much more restrictive than in PR. It takes many years to
aster advanced physics, such as the mathematics of String Theory.
quivalently, to be an experimental physicist, tools such as electron
icroscopes cost hundreds of thousands of pounds; or, even more
xtreme, the Large Hadron Collider cost billions of Euros, and is in-
ccessible to most. In biology, an experimentalist spends many years
earning just one tricky technique for reﬁning biochemical reactions
o observe their phenomenon of interest. In Pattern Recognition how-
ver, we all have Matlab, Python, Weka, and fast computers, the toolse need to do good work. The theory side is also not too obscure—a
tudent in computational learning theory can start to contribute ex-
ellent work before they graduate. It is likely this will change with
ime as the ﬁeld matures. 
Experimental tools are maturing too. GPUs and multi-core ma-
hines are commonplace, but learning how to program them is non-
rivial. Datasets such as Twitter-feeds are posing new challenges to
s, and dealing with this data scale takes special skills, and increas-
ngly, large budgets. Datasets too may become commodities; we are
lready seeing that only large industry practitioners can afford tackle
ertain types of problems. Take it further into the future—what hap-
ens when the tools of Machine Learning are custom built neural mi-
rochips, ala the positronic net of Commander Data in Star Trek? This
s not such an implausible direction to head. Why should we not have
omputing devices that are by construction inherently suited to infer-
nce tasks, either deductive or inductive? It could be argued that such
evices are at prototype stage already with neuromorphic computing
26] . 
As the theories in the ﬁeld becomes more sophisticated, the tech-
iques will take many years to learn. As the tools become more spe-
ialised, they will become more ﬁnancially inaccessible. Although we
ave argued that theory/experiment is not an isomorphic dichotomy
o uniﬁer/diversiﬁer, it is one factor. If theorists and experimenters
ecome very distinct roles in PR, with theorists rarely (if ever) learn-
ng the tools of experimenters, and vice versa, then the gulf between
niﬁer and diversiﬁer may grow larger. 
So, maybe we will never have a fully uniﬁed discipline of Pattern
ecognition. It is likely however that we need both the forces of uni-
cation and diversiﬁcation to move forward, summarised eloquently
y Langley [17] , referencing Dyson: 
“Just as the twin forces of gravity and pressure hold a star in dynamic
equilibrium while generating energy, so the joint processes of diver-
siﬁcation and uniﬁcation can hold a science together while fostering
progress. 
To conclude, in my own career to date, I have mostly been a uni-
er. However, Dyson deﬁnes diversiﬁers as those who like exploring
he details of nature, and that uniﬁers prefer the broad brush, the big
icture. I believe fruitful uniﬁcations only come from looking at the
etails—so maybe I am a bit of both, but it is fun to consider. 
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